CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES OF THE RULE
ON PRECAUTIONARY HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER
EDELITO E. MERCENE JR
I. INTRODUCTION
-
- Concept and Basis of Hold Departure Orders
- Previous DOJ Policies (hold departure orders, watchlist orders, and allow departure order
- Unconstitutionality of Previous Policies
- The New Rule on Precautionary Hold Departure Order, Its Policies, and Salient Points
(A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC)
II. INFIRMITIES OF THE PRECAUTIONARY HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER (PHDO)
-
- Impediment on the Right to Travel
- Violation of Procedural Due Process
III. PROPOSED CHANGES
a. Recalibration of a Broad Provision
b. Preliminary Investigation Shall Precede PHDO
IV. LEGAL BASIS
a. Adherence to the Supreme Law
V. CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Concept and Basis of Hold Departure Order policies
The right to liberty as guaranteed by the 1987 Philippine Constitution includes the freedom from personal restraint or servitude.[1] The current legal system, however, is replete with jurisprudence which suggests that this right is not to be treated as an absolute one. While citizens enjoy their fundamental constitutional guarantees, the right to liberty could be limited by the state’s inherent and sovereign ‘police power.’ The state, through the Legislature and its delegates, has the power to wield its lawmaking power to improve public interest and general welfare for the comfort, safety, and well-being of its citizens.[2]
While the Legislature is given such power, it is elementary that the Executive and Judiciary branches of the government are likewise given their respective and individual powers; hence, the existence of policies such as the regular release of administrative matters on the part of the Executive and the implementation of Rules of Court by the Judiciary. To illustrate, the Department of Justice (DOJ) released on June 7, 2010, its Department Circular No. 41 which detailed the rules and regulations for hold departure orders (HDOs), watchlist orders (WLOs), and allow departure orders (ADOs). Its whereas clause is enlightening as to the legal basis of its circular:
WHEREAS, apart from the courts, the Secretary of Justice as head of the principal law agency of the government mandated to, inter alia, investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders, and provide immigration regulatory services, is in the best position to institute measures to prevent any miscarriage of justice, without, however, sacrificing the individual’s right to travel.[3]
B. Previous DOJ policies
The DOJ, under the Executive branch, to prevent the escape of flight risk[4] offenders of the law, enacted certain policies to prevent stealthy departures that impede the criminal justice system. On March 19, 1998, the DOJ released Department Circular No. 17 which allowed for HDOs and gave authority to the President, Secretary, or a Regional Trial Court (RTC) to command the Commissioner of Bureau of Immigration (BI) to prevent flight to another country of Filipinos and aliens that are included in BI’s Hold Departure List.[5]
Said department added the issuance of WLOs and ADOs to its policies through its succeeding Department Circular No. 18.[6] On the one hand, WLOs likewise prevent the departure of people outside the Philippines and may be issued to people who still have pending preliminary investigation or petition for review before the DOJ. On the other hand, an ADO allows the departure of a person who is a subject of a WLO or an HDO upon request and with authority to travel from the prosecutor or the office where the case is pending.[7]
On June 7, 2010, the DOJ consolidated both policies into Department Circular No. 41.[8] The said circular expressly repealed all rules in both Circular No. 17 and 18 as well as parts that were inconsistent with the succeeding circular.[9]
C. Unconstitutionality of Previous Policies
The Court had the occasion in Genuino v. De Lima to declare Department Circular No. 41 unconstitutional, including all issuances released pursuant thereto. In this case, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the said policy on the ground that it allegedly violated the constitutional guarantee on the right to travel. In Genuino, the Court found no legal basis for the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41. The Court reasoned that said circular was only an administrative issuance and not a law; hence, the lack of a particular law or statute granting the secretary of justice the power to curtail the right to travel.[10]
Further, since the DOJ is an office under the Executive branch of the government, the argument that hold departure orders were implemented in furtherance of the inherent police power of the state was not sustained. The reason for this is that police power is lodged to the Legislature and shall be implemented through an enabling law. Here, the right to travel may only be impaired when public health, national security, and public safety are in peril; the impairment shall be through an enabling law. Needless to say, the DOJ, for obvious reasons, cannot enact a law since legislation is within the province of the legislature.[11]
D. The New Rule on Precautionary Hold Departure Order, Its Policies, and Salient Points (A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC)
In 2018, the Supreme Court en banc approved the proposed Rule on Precautionary Hold Departure Order (PHDO) which seeks to prevent the departure of a person suspected of a criminal offense from the Philippines to a foreign country, a policy comparable to the previous DOJ hold departure order.[12]
The Rules provide the necessary conditions for a valid PHDO: that it be in writing; that it be issued by a court; that it must command the Bureau of Immigration for the prevention of the unwanted departure of the respondent to a criminal offense; that it shall be issued ex-parte; that it shall only be applicable in cases involving crimes where the minimum penalty prescribed by law is at least six (6) years and one (1) day; that the imposable penalty requirement is not to be treated as applicable when the offender is a foreigner; that it may be filed by a prosecutor with any RTC having the jurisdiction over the crime; and that there shall be preliminary determination of probable cause based on the attachments, complaints, and complaint-affidavits.[13]
PHDOs cannot issue except upon a probable cause determined by a judge. Another condition provided by said Rules is the high probability of the respondent departing from the Philippines to evade arrest and prosecution. Similar to the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and search warrant, the Rules on PHDO provide that the judge shall personally examine, in the form of searching questions and answers, the applicant and the witnesses he may produce on the facts personally known to them. Sworn statements shall be attached to the record. Further, the examination shall be done in writing and under oath or affirmation. The judge shall issue the PHDO upon determination of probable cause, prompting the BI to prevent the respondent from departing at any Philippine airport or ports. The judge, however, can dismiss the application due to a lack of probable cause.[14]
After the investigating prosecutor had a successful determination of the ‘preliminary determination of probable cause’ as well as the judge’s ‘determination of probable cause’, both resultant findings become solely based on the complaint. In other words, both determinations are specifically issued for the purpose of granting the PHDO. Consequently, when there is determination of probable cause which justifies an issuance of a PHDO, it does not, in any way, affect the resolution of the prosecutor on a pending preliminary investigation.[15] Section 5 of the said Rule adds:
If the prosecutor after preliminary investigation dismisses the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause[,] then the respondent may use the dismissal as a ground for the lifting of the PHDO with the regional trial court that issued the order. If the prosecutor finds probable cause and files the criminal information, the case with the court that issued the PHDO, on motion of the prosecutor[,] shall be consolidated with the court where the criminal information is filed.[16]
Hence, the Rule implies that PHDOs may be granted even before the investigating prosecutor finishes his preliminary investigation. As the title of the Rule suggests, the order is indeed just for precaution.
Additionally, Section 7 of the same Rules states that only because of meritorious ground and by way of a verified motion of the respondent before the court that issued a PHDO shall the temporary lifting of said order take effect. The basis for this meritorious ground shall either be the existence of a doubt that probable cause exists or a showing that the respondent is not a flight risk. The Rules require the respondent to post a bond. Finally, where a PHDO is lifted, it is without prejudice to the pending preliminary investigation and its resolution before the investigating prosecutor.[17]
II. INFIRMITIES OF THE PRECAUTIONARY HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER
A. Impediment on the right to travel
The right to travel is part and parcel of the right to liberty.[18] Thus, Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.”[19] Even so, the right to travel is not absolute as there are inherent, statutory and constitutional limitations regulating said right.
The above-cited constitutional provision presents the justification as to the impairment of the right to travel. In Genuino,[20] however, it states that there must be an express provision in the Rules of Court or statutory law providing for such impairment. The constitutional requirement for a legislative enactment prevents unbridled exercise among administrative officials who might abuse the impediment of the right to travel under the cloak of apparent necessity. As per its statutory limitations, the case of Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator v. Heusdens[21] had the occasion to enumerate current laws justifying the impairment of right to travel, to wit: restriction on the right to travel of an individual charged with terrorism under the Human Security Act of 2010; restriction and/or withdrawal of the use of a passport of a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Passport Act of 1996; management of migration to avoid human trafficking under the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003; refusal of granting permits for Overseas Filipino Workers seeking to work in a specific country under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995; restriction of movement of a respondent who is a subject a protection order under the Act on Violence Against Women and Children; and the restriction on the movement of an adoptee’s right to travel in and out of the country to prevent exploitation under the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995. Further, the inherent power of the courts to issue hold-departure orders justifies the curtailment of the right.
The Supreme Court in Genuino stated that the issuance of HDO is a power inherent in Philippine courts. Despite the lack of constitutional provisions or legislative bestowal, the said power remains to be a part of the court’s judicial power.[22] The power is implied and essential. Thus, Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez states:
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or essential to the existence, dignity[,] and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court’s jurisdiction and render it effective [on] behalf of the litigants.[23]
‘To err on the side of caution’ appears to be the most viable justification for the issuance of departure orders; however, it must not trample on people’s fundamental rights. The issuance of precautionary hold departure order pending preliminary investigation, while laudatory, violates certain constitutional guarantees such as the right to travel. With the new rule on issuing precautionary hold departure orders, a person, then, can be barred from leaving the country despite the absence of the filing of an Information against him, or pending preliminary investigation and the determination of probable cause showing that he probably have committed an offense. The person will be barred from exercising his own faculties and his right to movement even before there is a warrant of arrest against him.
In the 1991 case of Silverio v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court likewise recognized court-issued departure orders as a valid restriction on the right to travel. Where a person flees abroad while having charges before Philippine courts, the latter can compel the former’s return to the country. If he has yet to leave the country, the courts can restrain him from leaving.[24] The facts in Silverio are enlightening. Here, the petitioner had already faced charges before the courts. Then, the petitioner violated the conditions of his bail. He likewise failed to appear before the court upon order and received more than one warrant for his arrest. It is important to note here that the petitioner had already been formally charged in an Information. The urgent motion to cancel the petitioner’s passport and to issue a hold-departure order came two years after the information was filed. Hence, it could be deduced that the preliminary investigation preceded the application for the issuance of the hold-departure order.[25]
B. Violation of Procedural Due Process
The present Constitution is replete with provisions that guarantee due process in all criminal cases. Section 14 (1), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution provides that due process shall be observed before a person is to be made answerable to a crime. Under subsection (2) of the same section, the Constitution guarantees an accused’s presumption of innocence, his right to be heard,his right to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation , and his right to an impartial trial.[26] Section 1 under the same article provides that no one shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law.[27] Notice and hearing are two essential elements of procedural due process. In other words, the said elements cannot be disregarded in criminal proceedings. Otherwise, it shall violate the above-cited provision.[28]
Other sources of law hint at the necessity of due process in criminal cases. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris states that “everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.” Article 10 of the same declaration states that every person shall have full equality to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal. Additionally, Article 11 guarantees the presumption of innocence to the accused, comparable to the right granted under the current Philippine Constitution.[29] Jurisprudence likewise recognizes the right. As early as 1920, due process law is said to be violated when a person is condemned without him receiving a proper hearing.[30]
The issuance of PHDO tramples on the right of the accused to be heard. It is conceded that a reasonable justification for the issuance of a precautionary measure would be to surprise a potential criminal, leaving him with no faculty to stealthily evade a charge or a possible charge. However, such a reason goes against the guarantee of notice and hearing. As could be gleaned from the Rules on PHDO, the order is to be issued ex-parte. In other words, there will be no chance for the respondent to submit counter-affidavits which might sway the court into thinking that there is no probable cause to justify the issuance of a PHDO. The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Rule 112 or the rule on preliminary investigations, allow the respondent to submit counter-affidavits and supporting documents.[31] This is the extension of rights beneficial to the respondent, which is lacking in the Rules on PHDO. To solve this infirmity, the Court added Section 7 or the provision governing the lifting of the order.[32] As mentioned before, a verified motion on meritorious grounds could lift an order. However, this lifting presupposes an already implemented PHDO. Hence, the respondent had already been deprived of his right to travel even before he can give the court proof that probable cause does not exist or that he is not a flight risk.
While it is admitted that there would be an observance of the investigating officer’s preliminary interpretation of probable cause and the judge’s own determination of probable cause,[33] it must be pointed out that there would be cases where a PHDO may be filed against a person who has not yet been arraigned and arrested. Procedural due process includes actual arraignment as one of its elements. In a criminal prosecution, arraignment allows the accused to be apprised of the nature and the cause of the accusations against him.[34] People v. Nuelan expounds:
It is imperative that the accused is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him.[35]
Finally, the order can likewise be implemented prejudicially towards a person pending determination of probable cause that he committed a criminal offense and that he committed said offense in a proper preliminary investigation proceeding.
III. PROPOSED CHANGES
A. Recalibration of a Broad Provision
To strike a balance between a person’s right to travel and the state’s duty to promote rehabilitative and retributive justice, one broad provision under the Rules on PHDO must be narrowed down. It is conceded in the previous sections that the power to issue hold-departure orders is inherent in courts. The purpose, then, is not to completely strike down the Rules since said preventive and precautionary measures still aid the criminal justice system.
Section 1 of A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC states that the PHDO shall apply only to cases involving crimes where the minimum penalty prescribed by law is at least six (6) years and one (1) day.[36] This could be seen as a broad guideline in determining the group of crimes the respondents have to commit which will justify the State’s impediment on the respondents’ right to travel. To reiterate: “Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.”[37]
Absolute precision with regard to the enumeration of crimes that will justify hold-departure orders is not required. However, due process dictates that said broad provision shall be reconciled with the three justifications, which allow for the impairment of the right to travel as provided by the Constitution. The danger of not narrowing down said provision is this: there are crimes where the minimum penalty prescribed by law is at least six (6) years and one (1) day, but said crime is not within or does not in any way affect the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. In that case, the state shall not have the right to impede one’s right to travel. On the one hand, there is justification to prevent a person accused of rebellion from fleeing the country. Rebellion is a continuing crime[38] prejudicial to public safety. The prescribed penalty for a principal to the crime of rebellion is reclusion perpetua,[39] a penalty far higher than the minimum required by the Rules on PHDO. On the other hand, there shall be no justification to impede the right to travel of a public officer or employee accused of arbitrary detention[40] when he detains a private person for more than fifteen (15) days but not more than six (6) months. The prescribed penalty for such crime is prision mayor or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve years of jail time.[41] While it satisfies the minimum requirement of the Rules on PHDO, said crime cannot be classified as prejudicial to national security, public health, public safety, and other judicial and statutory limitations on the right to travel.
So as not to impede the guarantee on a person’s right to travel, it is suggested that proper grounds for curtailing one’s departure must be established. Hence, there must be a satisfactory, complete, and comprehensive preliminary investigation accomplished by the investigating prosecutor before the issuance of PHDO.
B. Preliminary Investigation Shall Precede PHDO
It is then proposed that the preliminary investigation shall precede the PHDO for the following reasons: hold-departure orders will be based on a thorough and complete preliminary investigation done by a competent officer taking into consideration the affidavits of the offended party and the counter-affidavits of the respondent; there is no need for a separate ‘preliminary’ determination of probable cause on the part of the prosecutor and a separate determination of probable cause on the part of the judge who is to issue the PHDO; the courts will be spared from clogged dockets; and there will be no fear of impairing the rights of a respondent to travel and due process.
The resultant Information caused by the preliminary investigation should be enough ground for the issuance of a PHDO. Hence, there is no need for a separate preliminary determination of probable cause. Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure defines a preliminary investigation as “an inquiry or a proceeding the purpose of which is to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.”[42] Based from the cited provision, a pending preliminary investigation presupposes that a person has not been treated as an accused to the crime, as the prosecutor has yet to determine that the crime was committed by the respondent and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. The implementation of PHDO before a complete preliminary investigation runs afoul of the Constitution.
In Callo-Claridad v. Esteban, the Court enumerated the purposes of a preliminary investigation: (1) inquiry on the commission of a crime and the accused’s connection to it; (2) preservation of evidence and keeping the witnesses within the State’s control; and (3) the determination of the amount of bail.[43] Preliminary investigation benefits both the respondent and the State. On the one hand, the respondent is spared from ignominy, expense, inconvenience, and stress in the course of the usual trial until an investigating officer determines the probability of his guilt. On the other hand, the State is spared from the burden of unnecessary expenses in holding an accused to trial arising from false and ungrounded charges.[44] The controlling objective and purpose of preliminary investigation are economy and the eventual efficiency of the criminal justice system. A suggested recourse, then, is to utilize the findings of the preliminary investigation to justify the issuance of PHDO. Otherwise, said policy is redundant and unnecessary.
It is conceded that preliminary investigation as a precedent might negate the “precautionary” nature of the PHDO. It might even aid wealthy criminals to evade prosecution pending determination of probable cause that they probably committed the crime. However, it is without legal basis to curtail fundamental rights on the guise of precaution. To reiterate, there will be cases wherein a respondent has already been deprived of his right to travel even before he can provide the court evidence that probable cause does not exist or that he is not flight risk in a proper and exhaustive preliminary investigation.
In cases where a respondent flees using faculties that expedite his flight, the State and the offended party are not automatically deprived of justice. Currently, the Philippines has secured treaties concerning extradition[45] with Hong Kong, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, the United States of America (USA), the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Kingdom of Thailand.[46] China, India, Russia, Spain, Thailand and the United Kingdom are also countries which have extradition treaties with the Philippines.[47] To add, the Philippines has treaties on mutual legal assistance[48] with the USA and Australia with regard to criminal matters.[49] Data shows that the Philippines had requested extradition of 12 respondents who fled to the USA, two in Canada, and one in Indonesia in the years leading to 2001.[50] This extradition policy[51] strikes a balance between the furtherance of the criminal justice system of the State and the fundamental rights of the accused.
IV. LEGAL BASIS
A. Adherence to the Supreme Law
In Genuino, the Supreme Court stated that the Constitution is inviolable and supreme of all laws.[52] The right to travel and the right to due process by implication ranks higher above any laws or administrative issuances albeit subject to certain inherent limitations. If any of these municipal laws violate any provision of the Constitution or any norm thereof, it is to be treated without full force and effect.[53] Genuino gives light as to the supremacy of a constitution: “The Constitution is a testament to the living democracy in this jurisdiction. It contains the compendium of the guaranteed rights of individuals, as well as the powers granted to and restrictions imposed on government officials and instrumentalities. It is that lone unifying code, an inviolable authority that demands utmost respect and obedience.”[54]
While rules, administrative issuances, and laws yield to constitutional norms, the latter rights are not absolute. The right to liberty, for instance, does not permit an individual to whimsically abuse this right and do whatever he wants to do, since no one’s right should be superior to the other.[55] There are instances as well where the right to due process can be justifiably curtailed. For instance, those rights that are subject to summary abatement provided by the Civil Code on dealing with nuisance per se. Nonetheless, since the Philippines adopts a constitutional government and continues to be guided by a charter treated as the supreme law of the land, the general rule is to prioritize liberty and treat restraint as an exception.[56] Consequently, restrictions in the exercise of fundamental rights are discouraged so as to prevent its interference with the people’s free exercise of their constitutional rights.[57]
V. CONCLUSION
The Rule on PHDO was approved in 2018 to prevent the departure of suspected criminals as a precaution and in furtherance of an effective criminal justice system. The Rules, albeit a reiteration of previous DOJ policies, require a preliminary determination of probable cause on the part of the investigating prosecutor and a determination of probable cause on the part of the issuing judge. Said determination of probable cause is only for the purpose of issuing PHDO and shall not prejudice the ongoing preliminary investigation against the subject of the PHDO.[58]
The same Rules seem to impede the right to travel and the right to due process. A person can be barred from travelling to another country upon the issuance of a PHDO, even if he is a subject of an on-going preliminary investigation, or even if he has yet to be charged, arraigned, or arrested. Further, the Rules seem to violate a person’s right to due process, since a part of his liberty is restrained pending determination that he probably had committed the crime. In addition, the said PHDO is issued ex-parte;[59] hence, the lack of the accused’s chance to submit counter-affidavits to dispute the finding that there is probable cause for the issuance of a PHDO.
The best recourse is to adhere to the supreme law of the land, which is the Constitution. The right to liberty and the right of the state to prosecute shall meet halfway through the proposed fixing of a broad provision in the Rules. An enumeration as to the crimes that will justify PHDOs is not required. However, due process demands that the said provision shall be reconciled with the justifications which permits impairment of the constitutional guarantee on right to travel. The suggestion, then, is the establishment of proper grounds of curtailing one’s departure. Finally, for a just and organized criminal procedure, a preliminary investigation by a competent officer shall precede the issuance of PHDO so as not to trample upon fundamental rights, for no amount of exigent circumstances, as a general rule, can justify the same.
[1] Rubi, et al. (manguianes) v. The Provincial Board of Mindoro, G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919.
[2] Id.
[3] Department of Justice, Department Circular Order No. 41, Lawphil, June 7, 2010
[4] “The danger that someone accused of a crime will try to escape out of the country or area before their trial begins.” (Flight Risk, dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/flight-risk (last accessed February 7, 2022))
[5] Department of Justice, Department Circular Order No. 17, s. 1998, O.G., March 19, 1998.
[6] Department of Justice, Department Circular Order No. 18, DOJ, April 23, 2007
[7] Id.
[8] Department of Justice, Department Circular Order No. 41, Lawphil, June 7, 2010
[9] Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018
[10] Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018
[11] Id.
[12] Supreme Court, A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC, August 7, 2018
[13] Id.
[14] Supreme Court, A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC, August 7, 2018
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Supreme Court, A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC, August 7, 2018
[18] Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018.
[19] CONST., art. III, sec. 6.
[20] Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018.
[21] Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator v. Heusdens, A.M. No. P-11-2927, December 13, 2011
[22] Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018.
[23] Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 99289-90
[24] Silvero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991.
[25] Silvero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991.
[26] CONST., art. III, sec. 14.
[27] CONST., art. III, sec. 1.
[28] Isagani Cruz & Carlo Cruz, Constitutional Law, (2nd Ed., 2015)
[29] Universal Declaration of Human Rights. United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights (last accessed Jan. 10, 2022)
[30] Cornejo v. Gabriel, G.R. No. L-16887, November 17, 1920.
[31] RULES OF COURT, sec. 3, rule 111.
[32] Supreme Court, A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC, August 7, 2018
[33] Id.
[34] People v. Nuelan, G.R. No. 123075, October 8, 2001
[35] Id.
[36] Supreme Court, A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC, August 7, 2018
[37] CONST., art. III, sec. 6.
[38] Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001.
[39] REV. PEN. CODE, art. 135.
[40] REV. PEN. CODE, art. 124.
[41] REV. PEN. CODE, art. 124.
[42] RULES OF COURT, sec. 3, rule 111.
[43] Callo-Claridad v. Esteban, G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013
[44] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997
[45] “”Extradition” The removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.” (Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country, Presidential Decree No. 1069, sec. 2(a))
[46] Severino H. Gaña, Jr, Extradition and Legal Assistance: The Philippine Experience, 114th International Training Course Visiting Experts’ Papers 50-53, https://www.unafei.or.jp/publications/pdf/RS_No57/No57_10VE_Gana.pdf, (last accessed Feb. 5, 2022)
[47] International Legal Cooperation, Department of Justice, https://www.doj.gov.ph/international-legal-cooperation.html (last accessed Feb. 5, 2022)
[48] “The types of mutual legal assistance which the Philippines may provide in respect of criminal matters include: taking the testimony or statement of persons; providing documents, records and items of evidence; locating or identifying witnesses or suspects; effecting serving documents; making arrangements for persons to give evidence or assist in investigation; identifying, tracing, restraining, forfeiting and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of criminal activities, including restraining of dealings in property or the freezing of assets alleged to be related to a criminal matter; and executing requests for searches and seizures.” (Id.)
[49] Severino H. Gaña, Jr, Extradition and Legal Assistance: The Philippine Experience, 114th International Training Course Visiting Experts’ Papers 50-53, https://www.unafei.or.jp/publications/pdf/RS_No57/No57_10VE_Gana.pdf, (last accessed Feb. 5, 2022)
[50] Id.
[51] “The Department of Justice is the Central Authority on extradition matters. The Office of the Chief State Counsel of the Department of Justice handles and processes all requests for extradition in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Extradition Law and the applicable extradition treaty. Presidential Decree No. 1069 is the Philippine Law on Extradition. The provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of proceedings, apply to extradition cases.” (International Legal Cooperation, Department of Justice, doj.gov.ph/international-legal-cooperation.html (last accessed Feb. 5, 2022))
[52] Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018.
[53] Id.
[54] Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018.
[55] Id.
[56] Id.
[57] Id.
[58] Supreme Court, A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC, August 7, 2018
[59] Supreme Court, A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC, August 7, 2018
